7 Sep 2026 - Market commentary

No more punch

“Party's OVER? Hey, come on! What do you mean, the party's over? It's not even…” (Harvey – Trading Places)

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Will Hobbs

Chief Investment Officer

Time to read: 6 minutes
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As usual, one of the key problems facing investors is how to place the threats and opportunities of today in useful historical context. Which periods of past market exuberance could help us frame whatever levity exists today? Or perhaps help tell us whether a repricing bond market is about to spoil the fun? Inevitably, many look to the recent past for the surest answers. Below we explore why the crises of the last 25 years may contain more to mislead than inform.

Debt dyspepsia

Even with the distance from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09, it is amazing how many important and influential misconceptions linger. One of the most potent surrounds debt and solvency. Many still argue that 2007–09 saw the world economy collapse under the weight of aggregate borrowing – governments, consumers, and certain segments of the corporate sector simply loaded up on too much debt. Academia infamously provided some high-profile support.[1] Some famous names in the industry got in a (noisily overconfident) pickle too.[2] The obsessive focus on debt levels relative to GDP is still influential on policy today.[3]

The reality is that it is all too easy for all of us individuals to see little difference between our own attempts to borrow and those of companies and even governments. Yes, there were certainly areas of the economy where debts had outrun the respective capability to service or repay them in the run up to crisis. NINJA[4] loans became the posterchild in the personal loan space, while Greece ultimately grabbed that honour in the arena of national debt. The alphabet soup of packaged loans aimed at satisfying surging demand for safe assets, alongside wafer-thin bank balance sheet buffers, were certainly emblematic of a dangerous complacency and vulnerability. However, a more detailed and dispassionate assessment points to a more complicated story.

Ultimately the global economic heart attack was triggered by evaporating confidence in the wake of Lehman’s rapid disappearance. As the authorities moved to make an example of the suicidally overextended investment bank, the banking sector quickly lost confidence in itself - who or what was next? Complicated balance sheets were no longer a sign of diversified lending risks, but a fatal impediment to trust between institutions. The result was a devastating choke in the essential flow of finance between banks. Further failures followed. Doom loops between financial sectors and sovereigns were laid bare the world over and policy makers were left scrabbling to contain the damage and avert a repeat of the depression of the 1930s.

It is all too easy in hindsight to judge decision makers of the time for not stepping in to rescue Lehman’s, or for not foreseeing the consequences of their lack of action. However, the context is extremely difficult to recreate from our more chastened moment. The interconnections and dependencies were near-impossible to see, even in the most detailed assessments prior to the shock. Many tried.[5] Some will point to the few who made big profits from betting in the right direction.[6] However, even they couldn’t see the full horror of it. The ones who claimed they did fall mostly into the stopped-clock doomer category – the false prophets who busy themselves predicting the end of times all the time and make a big deal of it when the bad stuff does eventually happen.

Back to basics…

The development of the concept of ‘interest’ helped solve one of humanity’s most binding trade-offs. For much of our history, we could either invest in the production of goods and services that could be consumed today, or we could invest in the production of capital goods and research that might support higher living standards in the future, but not both at the same time.7 The payment of interest helped solve this by acting as an incentive to those who would sacrifice spending power today, in exchange for spending power later. That then freed up others to spend more than they earned today. In exchange, the recipients of the loan agree to either spend less later (if they are borrowing to buy consumer goods and services) or produce more later (if they are borrowing to invest in expanding society’s productive capacity).

Through this, you can hopefully begin to see that the popular worry that we are collectively ‘borrowing from future’ is subtly mistaken. At the global level, there can be no net debt. One person’s debt is another’s asset. Interplanetary borrowing does not yet exist (get ready to choke down some neatly packaged subprime mortgages, Martian microbes). Lenders and borrowers must therefore net out and be alive at the same time. The resulting implication is that the lazily summed piles of global debt we are daily harangued about do not tell us how scarily in hock we are to the future. They merely tell us how much spending power is being shuffled around the world. The changing interest on offer from various types and maturities of debts is key to roughly organising incentives to engage in this important process.

Furthermore, debt is not a factor of production. It does not directly produce anything, it is part of the organisation of productive forces as suggested above. Periods of re or de-leveraging in one part or other of the economy do not therefore tell us about growth prospects in the way much of the commentary demands.

Changes in interest rates certainly do affect people and businesses. However, the effects are not consistent over time, nor therefore are they particularly predictable. Among other things, this comes back to the idea that we do not make decisions in a reliably systematic way, much to the frustration of model dependent economists. Instead, our agendas rest unsteadily on frequently singular, and ever shifting, definitions of self-interest.

Back to today

The simplest explanation for rising interest rates around the world today is happily also the most benign. The period between the GFC and Covid is the anomaly, not today. Much of the world economy then was struggling to get off the canvas. Bludgeoned by GFC, Euro crisis and multiple other body blows, the result was low, even negative, real interest rates for much of the decade. However, just as the WW2 rearmament helped rouse the US from the painful economic slumber of the 1930s, we can see the various pandemic programmes as instrumental in jump starting the world economy from its post GFC equivalent. This much maligned splurge has acted in concert with an unfolding industrial revolution, German (and wider) rearmament and the global energy transition to spur borrowing/investment needs.

There is nothing for the well diversified investor to see here. Bonds are no longer offering return free risk, which is surely a good thing. Stocks are expensive in parts, but less sensationally so than some alarmists argue. Meanwhile, the rewards to diversifying beyond these two major asset classes are building, particularly for those worried over future inflation threats. Invest, diversify and be careful how you use the rear view mirror – there is no requirement for the road ahead to helpfully match the one we’ve travelled.

1 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff - Growth in a Time of Debt - American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 100 (May 2010): 573–572 https://www.bridgewater.com/big-debt-crises/principles-for-navigating-big-debt-crises-by-ray-dalio.pdf3 For evidence of the debt obsession see the IMF’s regular publication of summed global debt levels, as well as much of the mainstream media discussion and all too regular budget updates from the UK. See also America’s debt clock!4 No Income No Job or Assets.5 IMF global financial stability report April 20076 Michael Burry, depicted in the film ‘The Big Short’, made $285m from betting against the US housing market7 Matthew Klein – The Overshoot – Inequality, Interest Rates, Aging, and the Role of Central Banks (Aug 31, 2021)

Important Information

The information in this document does not constitute advice or a recommendation and you should not make any investment decisions on the basis of it. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results.

About the Author

Will Hobbs

Will brings extensive experience in global portfolios, equities, sector allocations, investment strategies and investment management for UHNW and HNW. He began his career with Barclays more than 20 years ago as a senior global equity analyst/vice president in the consumer sector and held roles of increasing seniority throughout his career including Head of Global Equity Strategy, Head of Investment Strategy and most recently, Chief Investment Officer and Head of UK Multi Asset Wealth.

You can find Will on LinkedIn here.

Image - Will Hobbs

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